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ABSTRACT
One of major considerations in an online business is customer privacy. Consumers are not interested in being monitored and
identified by sellers. Some solutions are proposed to hide selection of the customer but in the payment phase, there will be
a leakage of information as online shopper can infer some information about customer’s preference due to the price, which
is paid by customer. This is a big threat to customer privacy. Our solution to this problem consists of a number of one-unit
payment steps that cannot be linked to each other or to customer’s identity. At the end of purchase, content provider will
receive appropriate amount of money while customer will acquire a valid license anonymously. Content provider will not
be able to gain any information about the customer or the content that is purchased. In addition, a dispute resolution scheme
is presented for cases of conflict between customer and content provider. A series of analyses on the security, complexity
and DRM requirements are presented which indicate security and practicality of our scheme. Copyright c© 2013
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1. INTRODUCTION
There has been a long history of efforts to protect content (a term that indicates works of art such as movie, music, books,
etc.) from illegal distribution and duplication. Computers have had a strong impact on these efforts. That is because making
a copy of content on a computer is almost effortless. This has been a threat to content producers and distributers. Since
inception of high-speed networks this threat has become even more viable since distribution of copies of a content is now
easier that before. Today with existence of different types of contents and businesses which are related to content, more
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advanced types of permissions (like print, lending content, valid usage period, etc.) are required. DRM (Digital Rights
Management) is a field of study in cryptography and information security, which focuses on the problem of protection of
digital contents through management and enforcement of a set of permissions. Usually an online business is interested to
sell a digital content with some restrictions and limitations (e.g. an online book seller may want to prevent printing an
electronic book). These limitations are called permissions and a set of permissions defined for content is called a License.
A customer needs a valid license that is generated by content provider in order to consume a digital content. It is common
to provide customers with a special software or hardware unit (called renderer) which is required in order to consume a
digital content. This unit requires appropriate license in addition to the digital content itself in order to render content for
the consumer. In recent years there has been a strong push on development of DRM systems with specific security features
and functionalities such as secure storage [?], traitor-tracing [?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?], watermarking [?, ?, ?, ?, ?], fingerprinting
[?, ?], tamper resistant code [?, ?, ?] and permission revocation [?, ?, ?, ?].
In this paper, we suppose that a customer can access content anonymously and no one is able to trace who has
downloaded which content. In practice, content can be broadcasted (like IPTV [?] or satellite video) or made publicly
available through a bulletin board or a public website. In case of a public website, some mechanism is required in order to
make access to website anonymous, e.g., [?], [?], [?].
An important focus in DRM research (which is not covered in this paper), is to propose methods to prevent illegal copy
of digital content. Although there is not a working solution for this problem (because with analog output of data users can
capture audio or video and sell copies of captured content) there have been some proposed methods to copy-protect digital
content. These methods include legal prosecution of illegal copy distributors, watermarking techniques (which can be used
to find out the source of data leak) [?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?] and other software and hardware solutions [?, ?].
One important issue in DRM is keeping privacy of an online customer. In fact, it is desirable for an online customer
to be able to purchase a digital content without revealing any private information to any of parties, which are involved
in the process. Several solutions are proposed to solve this problem. However, most of them are not practical. Some
solutions force the content provider to apply a fixed price to all of contents and some others use expensive infrastructures
in order to hide identity of the customer and prevent others from tracing customer’s personal information. Some other
solutions provide partial privacy solutions for customers in which either customer’s identity or his preference is revealed.
Our contribution to solve this problem is that we have proposed a practical solution to DRM privacy. Our solution does not
require a special hardware or infrastructure and the content provider is free to set any price to any content. The solution
consists of a series of mini-payments size of each is one currency unit. Along with each mini-payment, a decryption key
is partially constructed by content provider. At the end of payments, content provider has received appropriate amount of
money while customer has a working decryption key that can be used to consume content. These mini-payments are not
linkable to each other so content provider is not able to detect which content is being purchased or which step of payment
is being executed at any time.
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Each mini-payment is performed using a one-time prepaid card, which is bought anonymously by customer. These cards
are generated by an issuing bank and can be verified at the time of purchase by receiving content provider to ensure validity
of the card and prevent spending a card multiple times.
This paper is organized as follows. Related work is covered in Section 2. We present our scheme in Section 3. In the
next section 4 we provide analysis of the proposed scheme according to different approchaes: Security, Complexity and
DRM requirement before we conclude and propose some open problems in Section 5.
2. RELATED WORK
One of important works in the area of privacy preserving payment for DRM is work of Perlman et. Al. [?]. In this paper
two methods are presented to obtain a digital license anonymously. The first method is based on anonymous cash and
the second one uses blind decryption. Both methods assume that there are public lists of contents, which are encrypted
using content encryption keys. Potential buyers can browse content provider website to preview list of available contents
and choose one of them. Each content has its own content identifier that can be used in communications with content
provider to indicate the exact content that buyer is interested in.Content provider has a database of content keys and
content identifiers. After purchase process, buyer will have appropriate content key, which can be used to decrypt one of
publicly available encrypted contents and consume that content.
In anonymous cash payment, the basic idea is that owning a signature of a bank on a data with a specified structure
(called R) has a specific value that can be used for purchase operations. But if bank knows which data it has signed,
this knowledge can later be used to find out identity of owner of the signature. When Alice is spending that signature as
electronic cash, bank will be consulted to confirm that the signature is spent only once. Upon this consult bank can find out
identity of the owner of the signature. In order to preserve identity of the signature holder, a blinding mechanism is used.
In case of anonymous-cash based DRM, Buyer (Alice) provides a blindedR in addition to her identity. Her identity is used
for payment operation, as she needs to pay with a credit card or use her prepaid account with merchant (or bank) to pay
for anonymous cash she will receive. Content provider checks received information and after successful payment, sends
signature on blinded R to Alice. One important drawback of this method is that we need anonymization infrastructures
(which are expensive in terms of computation and bandwidth[?]). That is because buyer needs to provide content ID to
the seller and without anonymization infrastructures seller can trace buyer’s request and will be able to know which buyer
wants to purchase the given content ID which will eliminate privacy of buyer. Another drawback of this method is that
buyer needs to reveal her identity to content provider upon receiving anonymous cash. That is because content provider
needs to know which account should be debited (in case of using pre-paid accounts with seller) or, in case of credit card
payments, seller needs to know billing information of buyer.
In Blind Decryption based payment DRM, Alice sends blinded encrypted key to the content provider who will decrypt
this data. As data is blinded, content provider will not be able to understand any information. Blind decryption is similar
to blind signature but as it does not require a ”public key” there are more algorithms for blind decryption than blind
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signature. Blind decryption can be used with various schemes including RSA, Diffie-Hellman and IBE (identity based
encryption).This method has two major drawbacks. First issue is that seller is able to understand identity of buyer. That’s
because buyer needs to provide a signature on her request. Another issue is that, in most cases seller will be able to
indirectly deduce some information about the content, which is purchased. Because buyer needs to provide the exact
amount of money she wants to pay for a content. If seller knows amount of money he is receiving, in case of contents with
varying prices, he will understand the content that is being purchased. The only case that we can prevent this problem is
by forcing seller to set a fixed price for all contents, which is not applicable in real world scenarios. A solution for this
problem is proposed (which we call Enhanced blind decryption based DRM) in the paper which suggests using multiple
keys each with multiple values.
Conrado et. Al. [?] present a privacy-preserving DRM scheme which is based on smart cards. Major entities that are
involved in this scheme are user, smart card (SC), smart card issuer (SCI), compliance certificate issuer for smart card
(CA-SC), compliance certificate issuer for compliant device (CA-CoD), compliant device (CoD) and content provider
(CP).
The paper explains three protocols for content purchase, anonymous license transfer and authorized domain creation. In
content purchase scheme, a user first buys a smart card from a retailer that provides anonymous smart cards. Each smart
card has an asymmetric key-pair (PK, SK) and a preset PIN number. User does not learn value of SK as the only entity
who knows this value is SC. Upon content purchase, a user contacts a content provider (CP) through anonymous channel
and provides a receipt of anonymous payment for content price in addition to PK of smart card. CP will be able to link a
PK to content but this does not threat user’s privacy as his identity is not linkable to PK. CP encrypts license with PK and
signs the result and sends the response to SC. As data is signed by PK, only SC will be able to decrypt this data.
In order to participate in interactions with a compliant device, SC needs a compliancy certificate from a CA-SC. To
acquire this certificate, sends PK to a compliancy certificate issuers who checks validity of the PK. There is a revocation
list of PKs available from SCI, which includes list of public keys, which are revoked (due to illegal activity or transfer
of license). After this check, CA-SC creates a random pseudonym called RAN and sends signed H(RAN) in addition to
encrypted RAN under PK to SC. This certificate can be later used as a proof of compliancy of smart card without revealing
personal information or PK stored in smart card. One disadvantage of using a compliancy certificate in multiple cases is
its likability. In order to resolve this problem, DRM rules enforce adding a validity period to a compliancy certificate and
periodical renewal of this certificate.
In order to consume a digital content on a compliant device (CoD) first user needs to transfer encrypted content and
license to the device. It is assumed that a CoD contains required compliancy certificate, which can be provided to user’s
smart card to prove compliance of the device. Smart card presents its compliancy certificate to CoD to prove its compliance
too. When a content is being consume, device can capture identity of the user but the only link that device is able to create
is between user identity and smart card compliance certificate which is not useful as compliance certificates are renewed
frequently. CoD sends encrypted license to SC for decryption using SC’s private key. After decryption, CoD can extract
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content decryption key from license and play the content for user. In case of attacker’s access to CoD it is possible to link
a user’s identity to RAN (used in SC’s certificate), content and license. However, attacker will not be able to learn PK.
The second protocol enables a user to transfer a license between to another user anonymously. In order to perform a
license transfer, first user (whose SC’s public key is PK) sends a request to content provider including his public key, license
details and public key of receiving user (PK’). Content provider, revokes first user’s license and creates a new license for
the second user. In order to prevent linkability of public keys it is proposed to use a generic anonymous license. Upon
transfer request, public key of receiving user is not sent to content provider. Instead an anonymous license is generated
which is sent to requesting user. This license is sent to second user who contacts content provider to convert this license
to a personal license. A method based on blind signature is used in order to prevent content provider being able to link a
previously generated anonymous license with public key of second user.
Usually a DRM user shares a set of devices with other members of a group (e.g. a family). In order to handle this
scenario, a concept of authorized domain is introduced. Authorized domain is a collection of CoD’s which are shared
between members of a group each having his own licenses and contents. A method is explained to create and manage a
domain, which preserves privacy of group members and prevents other entities to learn structure of the group.
This main drawback of the schemes proposed in this paper is that it forces users to possess a trusted hardware device
(which comply with certain DRM rules) in order to be able to participate in the scheme. In addition, it is assumed that
users contact authorities through anonymous channels, which seems impractical in World Wide Web.
In [?] Kavitha et. al. have proposed an transferable electronic cash which preservers privacy of the digital cash holder.
This scheme is based on Proxy Re-signature scheme which is used to support transfer of the money for a limited number
of times. The system uses a trusted third party to prevent double-spending of electronic money. Spending of digital cash
is done through a transfer protocol which is run between two users. At any point, a holder of digital cash can provide his
coins to the bank and deposit associated amount of money into his account.
Juans [?] has proposed an efficient and fair exchange scheme which preserved anonymity of the buyer. The scheme
is based on bilinear pairings. An exchange scheme is an electronic commerce scheme which provides exchange between
payment of the customer and the digital goods of the merchant. One important feature of this system is a dispute resolving
phase which is executed after exchange. This phase is divided into two sections. The first section deals with customer
requesting help and the second is for merchant requesting help. In this scheme, bilinear pairings and elliptic curves are
used to reduce computation and communication costs.
Wang et. al. [?] have proposed an off-line electronic cash scheme which preserves privacy of spenders. In this paper
work of Ziba et al. [?] is analyzed and some security flaws are found which prevent revealing identity of double-spenders.
The proposed scheme fixes flaws of Ziba’s system. Furthermore, this scheme supports all desirable properties of electronic
cash and is based on blind signature and discrete logarithm. Since this scheme is based on multiple authorities (Bank
and Central Authority) each of which contains a set of private information which are related to the customer, in case of
cooperation between parties, privacy of the scheme will be at risk.
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Win et al. [?] have proposed a privacy enabled DRM without reliance on a trusted third party. This scheme uses blind
signature and one-way hash functions to eliminate need for a trusted third party. The system uses a hierarchical network of
content providers which act as a seller of digital goods to end-users. The entity that creates a digital good is called the owner
which uses content provider network to distribute and sell digital content. This scheme uses anonymous tokens to preserve
privacy of the customers. These tokens are generated by content owner and end users can acquire them anonymously to be
used during content purchase.
Zhang et al. [?] have proposed a license mangement scheme for DRM which uses anonymous trust (LMSAT) to
preserve privacy of the license buyer. This scheme uses elliptic curve cryptography and is divided into two phases: License
acquisition phase and usage tracking phase. The paper assumes that each end-user has a DRM Agent (DA) installed on his
personal computer which acts on behalf of the user to acquire a license and consume the digital content. Other important
participants of LMSAT are Content Producer, Content Provider, Clearing House and the Client. During license acquisition
phase, a DRM agent acquires a valid license which is bound to anonymity ID from Clearing House. In this phase it is
assumed that the user has paid for the content and an anonymity ID is acquired as a result of payment phase.
2.1. Comparison
Table I represents a comparison between our scheme and two categories of privacy based DRM methods in terms of factors,
which are important in privacy. In this table, ◦ means that the scheme meets the requirement incompletely or partially.
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3. PROPOSED SCHEME
In order to provide payment infrastructure for our scheme, we use a system, which is called prepaid card system. Figure
1 illustrates static structure of players in the prepaid card system and the path of data flow between those entities. Bank
generates, stores and distributes prepaid cards to online stores. A customer will buy prepaid cards from online stores to be
able to participate in purchase process with a content provider.
Our scheme has two main operating phases. First phase is called card distribution and the second phase is purchase. In
card distribution phase, bank distributes cards’ information to online stores and in exchange receives associated amount of
money. No content purchase is performed in this phase. Figure 2 represents actions that are taken place in this phase.
The second phase (purchase phase) is the focus of this paper. In this phase a purchase operation is performed. To perform
a purchase operation, a customer sends information of one of his prepaid cards to a content provider in addition to a request.
Content providers contacts bank to check validity of the given card and if validation succeeds, it sends appropriate response
to the customer. The verification step is done in order to prevent a user from spending a single prepaid card multiple times.
As all cards are generated by a single entity (issuing bank) and all spent cards are checked with that same entity, in case of
double spending, the bank will detect the fraud and inform the accepting shop about this. Please note that only one card is
spent in this step so the purchase operation is not finished after verification is successful.
This process is repeated ’p’ times where ’p’ is the price of the digital content that customer wants to purchase. In this
mode, content provider acts as a stateless entity so it does not detect end of a series of requests from a customer regarding
a single purchase and is not able to link multiple requests to each other. The details of this step are explained in ”Purchase
Scheme” section. Figure 3 represent overview of this mode.
One useful property of using prepaid cards as anonymous electronic cash is that identity of the customer is not revealed
during purchase of a prepaid card or spending a prepaid card. As a result, privacy of a customer is preserved while at
the same time payment operation between customer and an online shop (content provider) can be done securely and
confidently.
3.1. Purchase Overview
Purchase operation of our scheme can be considered as an enhanced version of anonymous-cash DRM that does not
require Anonymizing Networks and can keep privacy of purchased content. This scheme can be called ”Blinded Partial
Decryption” in the sense that the decryptor (content provider) does not know the information that is being decrypted and
performs a partial decryption in each step. After a series of ’p’ partial decryptions (’p’ being price of the content), original
data will be available to the customer.
3.1.1. Prerequisites
We assume that an online seller (content provider) has a number of digital contents available for sale. Contents can
have any number of licenses attached. Each license has its own license identifier. In order to consume content, one
needs to obtain a valid license for that content. This process is called license purchase in which buyer provides seller
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Figure 1. Proposed scheme: static view using UML deployment diagram
with appropriate amount of digital money and seller provides buyer with a valid license decryption key that can be used
to decrypt an encrypted license. In addition, we assume a public website that contains information about contents and
licenses. Encrypted contents are public and can be anonymously downloaded. In order to consume content, one needs to
provide one of licenses for that content. Encrypted licenses are publicly available to download.
Digital contents can have different licenses for different types of consumers. For example for a digital book, we can
have two licenses. One which only allows reading the book and another license which enables consume to print the book
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Figure 2. Proposed scheme: dynamic view using UML sequence diagram (Card Distribution)
Figure 3. Proposed scheme: Dynamic view using UML sequence diagram (Purchase)
in addition to reading it. The major difference between licenses is their price, which reflects differences in the features
provided by them.
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In addition, we suppose existence of a one-time prepaid card system in which a consumer can buy any number of prepaid
cards anonymously by paying appropriate amount of cash. These cards do not reflect identity of their owner and they can
be used only once in a payment process. The most basic method to implement this feature is by banks generating unique
identifier strings and stores them in a Card Database. Each string in the Card Database can be used to print a prepaid card
for public use. Each card has a value of one currency unit (e.g. one dollar or one cent) although it is possible to publish
multiple-value prepaid cards. These cards can be distributed to physical shops and consumers can buy them and use their
identifier strings in purchase operations.
Each license has a set of license terms that are made public. Seller signs these terms plus encrypted license. This
signature is public which will be used in case the encrypted license is not according to publicly stated terms. In case of
dispute between seller and buyer, this signature can be used to prove a third party about invalid claims of the seller about
license terms. The complete process is explained in the ”Dispute Resolution” section.
We assume existence of a secure channel for information exchange between customer and content provider.
3.1.2. Scheme Overview
In the purchase operations, buyer provides seller with identifier string of his receipt and seller can check this identifier
with bank in order to confirm its validity. After selecting content and one of its licenses, buyer needs to prepare appropriate
number of prepaid cards for payment.
For purchase operation, buyer blinds license identifier and provides seller with blinded license identifier in addition
to identifier string of his first prepaid card. Seller verifies validity of given prepaid card string identifier. If validation
fails, seller sends appropriate response indicating error message and purchase process is terminated. In case of successful
validation, bank credits seller’s account. Seller performs an exponentiation on blinded license identifier and returns the
result to the buyer. After doing above process ’p’ times (where ’p’ is license price), seller will have ’p’ currency units in
his bank account and buyer will have a decryption key which can be used to decrypt license and consume content.
3.2. Scheme Details
Proposed scheme consists of two phases; Setup phase and Purchase phase. In the setup phase, some global system
parameters are generated and system data structures are published for customers’ view. In the purchase phase, we have
explained process of license acquisition and payment operations.
3.2.1. Setup Phase
First phase of scheme is setup phase. In this phase, seller prepares some important public and private parameters of the
scheme. For brevity we use ’B’ to denote buyer and ’P ’ to denote content provider (seller) in this scheme.
This phase contains below steps:
1. P selects a large prime number ’n’. All calculations in this scheme are modulus ’n’.
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Figure 4. Overview public data structures for a seller with three available contents, first content has three licenses each with its own
price
2. P creates a private/public key-pair for a secure public key encryption scheme. The private key will be used for
signing operation and public key will be used to check P ’s signature.
3. ’s’ is P ’s private license generation factor which is randomly selected.
4. Each content (Contentj) has a number of licenses: L1, L2, ..., Ln.
5. Each license (Li) has a public license encryption factor which is denoted by xi. No two xi numbers should be
powers of each other, e.g. ∀i, @j 6= i;xi = xaj .
6. Each license Li, is encrypted using Ci = xs
pi
i , where pi is license price. This is indicated by ECi(Li) where E is
a symmetric encryption algorithm (e.g. AES or any secure encryption algorithm).
7. For each license, a signature of P is made public. This signature is performed on the encrypted license and license
terms. This will be used in the dispute resolution scheme in the case that decrypted license (at the end of scheme
execution) does not confirm with publicly stated license terms.
8. P selects a public generator g.
9. Value of K1 = gs is made public.
Figure 4 represents a sample seller’s public data structures.
3.2.2. Purchase Phase
WhenB wants to purchase a licenseLi, with price pi, he needs to buy ’pi’ prepaid cards beforehand. Purchase operation
is performed according to following steps:
1. B selects a private random α and calculates r = gα. r is blinding factor which will be used to prevent P from
understanding which content, B wants to purchase.
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2. B sends first prepaid card identifier in addition to M1 = rxi to P .
3. P confirms validity of prepaid card (using issuer bank’s online services) and then raises receivedM1 to s and returns
Ms1 in addition to a signature on [M1,Ms1 ]. This signature will be used in a dispute resolution process in case of
conflict between buyer and seller.
4. B checks received signature. In case of a corrupt signature, a dispute resolution process (type C) will be executed.
Details of this process are explained in ”dispute resolution” section. B divides received response to Kα1 in order to
calculate xsi .
5. B sends another prepaid card identifier and M2 = rxsi .
6. P confirms validity of prepaid card and returns Ms2 in addition to a signature on [M2,Ms2 ]. This signature will be
used in a dispute resolution process in case of conflict between buyer and seller.
7. B checks received signature. In case of a corrupt signature, a dispute resolution process (type C) will be executed.
Details of this process are explained in ”dispute resolution” section. B divides received response to Kα1 in order to
calculate xs
2
i .
8. After ’pi − 2’ rounds of execution of steps 5 through 7, B will be able to calculate value of Ci.
9. B can use Ci to decrypt related license and consume the content.
Figure 5 represents overview of message transmission in our scheme (excluding prepaid card identifiers). At the end of
protocol execution, we have following conclusions:
1. Seller has received pi valid prepaid cards where pi is value of the license which is purchased.
2. Buyer has received Ci which can be used to decrypt appropriate license and use the related content.
3. Seller does not have any information about identity of the buyer.
4. Seller does not have any information about the license which is sold because any information which is received by
the seller is blinded (multiplied by r) or anonymous (using prepaid cards).
First two items ensure correctness of the scheme and the second two items ensure that scheme keeps privacy of the
buyer against seller.
To buy a license with price pi, 2pi message transmission between seller and buyer is required. This does not seem a
high number but for a famous seller with a large number of customers this can impose a high bandwidth and computation
overload which can impact his online reputation.
In order to fix this problem, we can modify the scheme as follows: In the setup phase, P publishes values for
Ki = g
si , i = 1, .... During scheme execution, value of K2 can be used instead of K1 to merge two payment messages
into one message. In this case, B will send a normal blinded data in addition to value of two prepaid card identifiers (or
a prepaid card which has a value of two currency units). When P receives a message, after verification of prepaid cards,
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Figure 5. Overview of messages in our scheme
he will raise received message Mi by s2 hence the response will be M
(
i s
2). B can divide received response by Kα2 . This
procedure can happen for any other value i for which there exists Ki.
P can publish any number of Kis to decrease required bandwidth and number of messages that need to be transmitted
for a purchase operation. Our suggestion is to publish values for K1, K2, K4, ..., K2n where n = blog2(max pi)c. In this
case, buying a license with price pi will require at most dlog2pie message transmissions.
3.3. Scheme Features
A useful feature of our scheme is zero-cost license upgrade. Suppose that customer has acquired a content license which
costs ’p’ currency units. Related content has another license which costs ’q’ where q > p (e.g. a basic license which costs
a small amount of money and a more advanced license which is more expensive). If user wants to upgrade his license to
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the advanced license, all he needs is to perform purchase operation on his license decryption key for ’q − p’ steps. After
these steps, customer will have an upgraded advanced license. The only requirement is that content provider should have
used a common license encryption factor (xi) for both types of licenses. Our scheme supports variable priced digital goods
and licenses. Many other schemes force seller to set fixed price for all of his contents to ensure privacy of the buyer. This
limitation is not practical in real-world scenarios and decreases chances of applicability of those schemes.
Usually a digital store has a number of digital contents for sale. Nevertheless, each content can have different licenses
for different types of usages of that good. This is a useful feature that is not covered in any related work. Supporting
this feature makes a scheme more practical and more interesting for online sellers. That is because a digital good can
have different features attached to it. For example a set of permissions are available for a digital book. These permissions
include ability to lend the book, print the book pages, copy the book, etc. In a real world online bookstore, seller wants to
offer different prices for a book, which has printing feature enabled, or a book, which can be lent by the buyer to others.
As a result, seller is interested to sell a single book with different prices each with its own set of permissions. In DRM, we
call a set of permissions related to a digital content, License. Therefore, we need to support a variable number of licenses
for a single digital book. Our scheme covers this feature and lets a seller define any number of licenses per digital good.
3.4. Dispute Resolution
One major problem in an electronic commerce related scheme is how to deal with disputes. A number of probable disputes
can occur which if not resolved appropriately using a fair method can make a good scheme impractical. A dispute is any
kind of disagreement between two parties of the scheme (buyer and seller) which cannot be resolved appropriately. To
resolve a dispute, two parties need to contact a trusted third party (an arbitrator or a judge) and provide related evidence.
The arbitrator will then process given evidence and claims of two parties to declare result.
Four possible disputes can happen in our scheme, which are called type A, B, C and D disputes. Type A dispute happens
when a seller states that a buyer has acquired a license without paying for it. This type of dispute cannot happen according
to security features of the scheme. A seller will continue execution of the scheme only in the case of receiving valid prepaid
cards as payments. Without proper execution of the protocol, a buyer will not be able to extract any information about the
license and decryption keys. The explanation of the details of this feature can be found in the ”security analysis” section.
Type B dispute happens when a buyer states that after successful execution of the purchase operation and receiving a valid
and working license-decryption key, the actual terms and permissions of the license are not according to seller’s claims.
Resolution of a type B dispute is straightforward, as seller has committed to his claims before scheme starts. This
commitment is publicly available using signature of the seller on license terms and encrypted license. A buyer can provide
arbitrator with seller’s signature, encrypted license and a log of protocol steps in order to be verified and processed. If
seller’s signature is valid, protocol steps are correctly performed and the result, decrypted license, does not agree with
committed terms, arbitrator states that seller is responsible for a refund. In any other case, buyer’s claim will not be
accepted. Please note that in this process, buyer will need to provide some private information to the arbitrator in order to
prove his claim. Although doing this will help arbitrator check the claims the buyer has made but buyer’s privacy will be
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damaged. Third type of dispute happens when buyer claims that he has received a corrupt or invalid signature from seller in
the middle of scheme execution. In this case buyer will contact an arbitrator and provide request/response in addition to the
received signature. Arbitrator checks signature’s validity and if buyer’s claim is verified, asks seller to provide originally
signed values. If values provided by seller and buyer are the same, arbitrator asks seller to generate a valid signature for
provided original values. In case of conflict between these values, this dispute becomes a type D dispute in which seller has
to prove arbitrator that his original data are correctly constructed. If seller’s proof is accepted by arbitrator, buyer’s claim
is rejected and seller’s provided data will be sent to the buyer. Please note that here we have an unfair advantage for seller,
as he is able to convince arbitrator using self-generated numbers, but we assume that a seller is interested in increasing his
reputation by making customers satisfied. Providing a solution for this problem will decrease anonymity of the customer,
which is not desirable. Because of mentioned reasons, we ignore this problem. If seller fails to convince arbitrator that he
has acted honestly, arbitrator asks seller to provide a signature on values provided by the buyer. The fourth type of dispute
(type D) occurs when buyer claims that after honest execution of scheme steps, at the end he has not received a working
key and is not able to decrypt the appropriate license.
To resolve this case, buyer needs to contact arbitrator for each step of the scheme. Suppose that transmitted messages in
the kth step of the scheme are, Qk = rxs
k−1
i , Nk = (rx
sk−1
i )
s where Qk is the request message sent from buyer to seller
and Nk is appropriate response. For each step a dispute resolution process needs to be done. For each execution of this
process, buyer provides arbitrator with Qk,Nk and seller’s signature on these values. This signature is used by arbitrator
to confirm that seller approves sending given response as a result of that request. If checking of any of steps is failed,
arbitrator will declare that seller has to provide correct value to the buyer. In case that all steps are validated without any
issue, arbitrator declares that seller is honest and buyer’s claims are rejected. Three methods can be used to resolve this
type of dispute. The first method which is the safest one in the sense that no private information of the seller needs to be
sent to arbitrator, consists of a zero-knowledge proof protocol execution [?, ?]. In this protocol, seller acts as prover and
arbitrator acts as a validator. Prover needs to prove that:
logNk (Qk) = loggK1
Values of Ki are public. These values are used in the purchase process for unblinding data but they are commitment of
seller on value of s. So this feature can be used to prove honesty of the seller to the arbitrator.
The second method uses a license decryption key, which is a private information of the seller. In this method, arbitrator
selects a random license, Li,from available licenses and asks seller to provide its decryption key, Ci, using a secure
channel. After checking validity of this key, arbitrator asks seller to perform a zero knowledge proof [?, ?] that:
logNk (Qk)
pi = logxi(Ci)
Here pi and xi are price and license generation factor of the selected license, respectively. His zero knowledge proof,
shows that seller has used the same value for exponentiation of buyer’s request which is used to create license decryption
key Ci. This method provides a better proof for seller but some private information need to be sent to arbitrator.
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The third method requires seller to send his private value, s, to the arbitrator. Arbitrator will re-generate request response
messages to check whether seller has performed honestly or no. This method uses seller’s private data, which is a negative
point, but the result will be deterministically correct. In any type of dispute resolution, neither seller nor arbitrator will have
access to buyer’s private information. Seller does not receive any type of information. The only responsibility of a seller
in dispute resolution is providing proof of his honesty using zero knowledge. Also arbitrator will not gain any information
about the identity of the buyer or the license which is being purchased because arbitrator does not know which step is
being processed right now and also all information which is sent to arbitrator (request and response) are blinded, which
cannot be used to extract any information about license which is being purchased.
4. ANALYSIS
In this section we analyse our scheme according to different approchaes. At first we evaluate requirements of a DRM
system and the way our scheme addresses them. Then we analyse complexity of our scheme (explained in section 3.2
and figure 5) in terms of computations and communication overhead for scheme participants. After that a discussion is
presented about security and anonimity of our scheme.
4.1. DRM Requirements Analysis
A DRM system has a number of stakeholders such as the content provider, rights provider and the end user. Each
stakeholder has its own incentives to use a DRM system. If incentives of participants are not met correctly, this system
will not be useful and applicable. Below we discuss our scheme with regards to DRM fundamental security requirements
as mentioned in [?].
1. Content should be available only in encrypted format using a secure encryption algorithm and decryption keys are
separately distributed by Rights Provider.
2. An interoperable, well-defined and fine-grained rights expression language is indispensable. In addition, license
should be transferrable to other devices within authorized domain of devices under control of the customer.
3. Content and license should be securely distributed and transmitted.
4. Information transmission between Content provider and Rights provider should be over a secure channel.
5. Content provider should use some specific mechanisms (e.g. Watermarking [?]) in order to embed some hidden data
structures within content for copyrights protection and pirate prosecution.
6. A DRM system should protect privacy of the user. Here we present a discussion about requirements that are covered
in our scheme.
16 journal 2013; 00:1–19 c© 2013
DOI: 10.1002/sec
Prepared using secauth.cls
M. S. Mohammadi A Privacy-Preserving Electronic Payment System for DRM
4.1.1. Content Encryption
We assume that contents are available in encrypted format. In order to consume content, a customer needs three
elements: Encrypted content, License and renderer software. An encrypted content is the content that customer wants
to purchase. In order to prevent illegal distribution of content, it is provided in encrypted format. Content will be decrypted
on customer’s machine upon consumption.
A license includes content decryption keys in addition to license terms.
A renderer software is a tool, which enables a customer to make use of a content. For example, this can be a movie
player, sound player or electronic book reader software.
4.1.2. Secure Content Transfer
As we have supposed that content provider and Rights Provider are same entities, our scheme does not require secure
data transmission between these two entities. Another aspect of this requirement is secure distribution and transmission of
content and license between content provider and customer. Our scheme meets this requirement as all public data (content
and license) are in encrypted format and we have assumed a secure channel between customer and content provider. This
secure channel can easily be created using a secure key agreement protocol (e.g. Diffie-Hellman key exchange [?]) or by
customer sending a predefined symmetric key to content provider secured using content provider’s public key.
4.1.3. Customer Privacy
Our scheme preserves privacy of the customer in the sense that no personal information of the customer is sent to any
party of the system. In order to purchase a content, customer does not need to disclose his identity, billing information or
even preference. No authority (content provider, online shops or bank) will be able to conclude what content is bought by
customer, even if they collude together.
4.2. Complexity Analysis
4.2.1. Computation Complexity
According to seller’s point of view, the computation workload is quite low. Seller always receives messages in format
(A,B) where A is information about a prepaid card or a set of prepaid cards and B is a blinded number. Seller needs to
validate ’A’ information and if confirmed, raise ’B’ to his private license generation factor, s, in order to prepare response
message.
In the basic scheme, on the buyer side, a random number, α, is selected and two one-time calculations are done. First
R = gα is done to calculate blinding factor, thenKα1 is calculated which will be used to unblind future messages. Then for
each step of the scheme, one unblinding operation (division to Kα1 ) is done. Table II, represents computation complexity
of the basic version of the proposed scheme for a license purchase with value p.
In enhanced scheme, multiple exponentiations are made on the seller’s side and buyer needs to calculate multiple values
of Kαi for different values of i. Table III represents computation complexity in the worst case for enhanced version of the
proposed scheme for a license purchase with value p.
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Table II. Computation Complexity of the Basic Scheme
Entity/Calculations Buyer Seller
Exponentiation 2 p
Division p 0
Signing 0 p
Total p+ 2 2p
Table III. Computation Complexity of the Enhanced Scheme
Entity/Calculations Buyer Seller
Exponentiation 1 + log(p) p
Division log(p) 0
Signing 0 log(p)
Total 1 + 2log(p) p+ log(p)
Table IV. Communication Complexity of the Proposed Scheme
Entity/Scheme version Buyer Seller
Basic version p(β + γ) 2pγ
Enhanced version log(p)(β + γ) 2log(p)γ
4.2.2. Communication Complexity
One of widely used mechanism to provide privacy protection in a payment system is using ANETs. Although these
systems hide identity of participants, they impose a lot of overhead in terms of bandwidth and computations. Our scheme
preserves privacy of customers without using ANETs.
Each request message from buyer to seller in the basic scheme contains information of a prepaid card and a blinded
number. Response will be a number too. If we suppose that prepaid-card identifier string has β bits and scheme modulus
has γ bits, for a purchase of a license worth p, the communication overhead of the protocol for buyer will be p(β + γ) bits
and for seller this overhead will be pγ bits plus size of digital signatures which is supposed to be γ for each signature. In
the enhanced scheme, the above calculations will be much smaller as in the worst case we will be using log(p) instead of
p. Table IV, represents communication complexity of our scheme:
4.3. Security Analysis
In order to do a security analysis on the privacy-preserving feature of our scheme, let suppose that seller has found out
identity of content buyer. This means that the seller is able to trace buyer’s identity using his prepaid card identifier. This
conflicts with our assumption that process of purchase of prepaid cards is done anonymously. Now suppose that seller has
found out the license (hence the content) that buyer is interested into. This means that given rxi seller is able to extract
value of xi. As a result seller has the knowledge about value of r which conflicts with our assumption in the first step of
purchase order. Suppose that buyer has calculated value of seller’s private license generation factor. In this case, he will be
able to calculate any license without paying money and without any type of contact with seller. This means that either he
knows value of s in advance (which conflicts with assumption that s is private) or he is able to calculate value of s during
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scheme execution. The latter case means that given xsi and by having value of xi, he is able to calculate value of s. In order
to solve this equation, he needs to solve discrete log problem for which no polynomial algorithm exists [?, ?].
As a result we can conclude that our scheme is secure in the sense that seller is not able to infer any information about
buyer and buyer cannot calculate private system parameters.
The only data that seller will receive is prepaid card data and a blinded string. None of these data can be used to infer
any information about identity of the buyer, the license in which buyer is interested or how many payments are done so
far for that license. Seller is not able to understand if received message is the first message of a series of payments for a
license or last message or any of intermediate messages. As a result, we have achieved a higher level of blinding which
we call ”Blinded Security Protocol”. In a blinded security protocol, one party does not know the current step of protocol
execution. According to all of his information, he is not able to deduce whether protocol is just started or is finishing. This
feature enhances privacy of the other party (buyer in our scheme).
One important parameter of the scheme is license generation factor, s, which is used by content provider to encrypt
licenses. If this number is stolen from content provider, security of the whole system will be at risk. To solve this issue,
content provider can regenerate a new license generation factor and content licenses and also expire old licenses. In this
case, no user will be able to consume an expired license. Of course, legitimate users who have previously purchased these
licenses can use them as long as the original validation period is not passed.
In the purchase process steps, customer selects a blinding factor (R) which is used to blind request sent to content
provider. In order to increase security and privacy of the customer, it is possible to change value of R in each step. This
enhancement will impose a computational overhead to customer but at the same time, security against side channel attacks
(e.g. IP routing monitoring and message eavesdropping) will be increased.
5. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
We have come up with a privacy preserving electronic payment system, which can act as a component of a DRM system.
This payment system helps buyers purchase digital goods without revealing their identity or preference to the seller or
financial institutions. Our scheme provides complete anonymity of the buyer while at the same time, makes seller sure
that he receives full payment of digital goods. Our scheme does not impose any limitations on the pricing of digital goods
and also does not require an anonymization infrastructure (ANET). A Dispute resolution scheme is presented which uses
a trusted third party to resolve conflicts between buyer and seller without threatening privacy of the buyer.
One important problem in DRM systems is tracking traitor users. A traitor is a user who acts against DRM system
rules (e.g. distributes copies of a digital good to others). In order to track such users, a DRM system needs mechanisms
to identify a traitor and revoke his license. One important step of our scheme is the prepaid card verification step, which
requires online connection of seller with card issues that is generally a bank. This requirement may impose a high overhead
to the seller and the bank. We believe that enhancing our scheme with an offline verification system can have a significant
impact on it’s applicability.
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